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I. INTRODUCTION
There are many substantive and procedural matters potentially
relevant to constructing a constitutional case and, more particularly
for this Article, critical in deciding where to sue and what claims to
include. My purpose is not to provide a full exploration of each topic
but rather to provide an introduction and general guide containing
amplification sufficient to identify in a concrete case whether and
which topics should be pursued further. Choice of forum requires a
balance of competing factors, some of which point to state court and
others to federal court. The most-and the least-that a good consti-
tutional litigator can do is to evaluate the topics presented here and
make an informed decision.
In Part II, I provide a list of topics with just enough discussion to
make sense of the case illustration provided in Part III. In Part IV, I
provide amplified, textual discussion with case citations pointing the
way to fuller exploration of each topic.
II. THE PRELIMINARIES
A. A Few Things to Consider
1. Are you primarily a constitutional litigator or primarily repre-
senting a client's interests?
2. Are there state constitutional or statutory claims that arise out
of the factual setting that you should consider including? What is
their relative strength as against possible federal constitutional or
statutory claims?
3. Should you try to settle?
4. Should (must) you first pursue administrative remedies or may
you proceed directly to court?
5. Keep your eye on the procedure. Make a paper trail.
B. Picking the Forum: In General
Factors influencing forum choice include:
1. Perception as to whether a state or federal judge will be more
receptive to your claims. Some litigators worry that state court judges
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will be less receptive to constitutional claims than federal judges be-
cause state judges hear comparatively fewer of them.
2. If there will be a jury, whether jury composition will be different
in state, contrasted with federal, court and how this difference will
affect jury receptivity to particular claims.
3. Statutes of limitation and other procedural issues-generally
the law of the forum controls these questions. Differences between
state and federal procedure may affect the progress of litigation and
enhance, or limit, the opportunity to advance and prevail on substan-
tive claims.
4. Comparative speed at which a case will proceed to hearing.
5. Obviously, factors such as time, money, client goals and energy
that inform forum choice in litigation generally also are relevant to a
constitutional case.
C. Picking the Forum: Issues Particular to Constitutional
Litigation
1. Doctrine of Independent and Adequate State Grounds. This doc-
trine applies only to state court litigation. When a state ground is
independent and adequate then the Supreme Court of the United
States has no power to review a federal ground that also may have
been raised and/or decided.
If an analysis of federal law and judicial receptivity to a federal
claim leads to a conclusion that the Supreme Court is unlikely to find
a right in federal law, and a similar analysis of state law leads to a
conclusion that there is a better likelihood of success on a state claim,
then instituting suit in state court and insulating a state claim as the
only ground of decision is an option worth considering. There is a
downside to this approach. If a plaintiff raises and focuses exclusively
on a state ground, then by definition (s)he foregoes reliance on a possi-
ble federal ground. Not only that, proceeding solely on a state ground
likely means relinquishing any chance subsequently to litigate a fed-
eral claim because the failure to litigate in the first action most likely
will be a procedural default barring relitigation.
2. Eriel-type Considerations. A federal judge faced with a question
arising out of state law must decide it the way that the state court
would. If there is an existing, but stale, state court decision on point,
the great likelihood is that a federal judge will follow that existing
decision. When a plaintiff seeks a change in state law, then, a state
forum should be chosen because it offers the only realistic possibility
for achieving change. Conversely, when a plaintiff seeks continuation
of an existing state court approach, then federal court is likely the
right place to be because there is little risk that the state court ap-
1. Erie R.R. Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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proach will be abandoned. Choosing a federal forum, however, is no
guarantee that a federal judge will decide the state question as she
instead might employ Pullman2 abstention or certify a state question
to a state supreme court.
3. Pullman Abstention. When a federal question case brought in
federal court includes a state question, Pullman abstention may be
employed. Pullman abstention means that a federal judge refers the
state question to a state court for resolution and waits to decide the
case docketed in federal court until after final decision in state court.
Pullman abstention most often is employed when resolution of a fed-
eral question necessarily requires resolution of an unsettled question
of state law.
4. Certification of State Question. Some states have statutes per-
mitting a state supreme court to resolve state law questions brought
in federal court. What happens is that the federal judge certifies the
question to the state supreme court and proceeds with federal court
litigation once the state supreme court responds.
5. Justiciability. Justiciability considerations dictate whether a
particular lawsuit may be brought. They are more likely to affect liti-
gation in federal court because the federal courts have stricter re-
quirements than many state courts and, except in a few isolated
instances, no state court has stricter requirements than the federal
courts.
6. State Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment. State
sovereign immunity may preclude litigation against a state in state or
federal court. Sovereign immunity effectively means that actions
against a state in state court typically are heard only pursuant to a
state tort claims act. Actions against a state in federal court involve
the scope of the Eleventh Amendment.
The Eleventh Amendment prohibits a federal judge from hearing a
suit against a state unless the state consents or congress has exercised
its constitutional authority to abrogate the state's immunity. Where
neither has occurred, a state may be sued neither for damages nor
even injunctive relief.
7. Federal Civil Rights Lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. Section
1983 authorizes lawsuits against state officers for violation of federal
rights. While state sovereign immunity makes section 1983 unavaila-
ble for suits against a state, it does not preclude suits against a city or
county.
8. The Ex Parte Young3 Fiction. When the Eleventh Amendment
bars a federal court suit against a state, the Ex parte Young fiction
nonetheless permits bringing a claim against a state officer that in
2. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
3. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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substance binds the state. Three conditions must be met: (i) the state
officer must have been acting in her official capacity; (ii) the activity
must be alleged to violate federal law; and (iii) the remedy sought may
be equitable only.
9. Supplemental (Pendent) Jurisdiction. Supplemental jurisdic-
tion is the means by which a claim based on state law may be heard in
federal court even though there is no diversity. For such a state claim
to be heard, there must be a federal claim in the case, and both state
and federal claims must arise out of the same nucleus of operative
fact.
10. Younger v. Harris4 Abstention. Younger v. Harris abstention is
the typical federal court response when a litigant seeks an injunction
against a pending state criminal proceeding (or civil proceeding such
as contempt that involves what the Supreme Court characterizes as
issues of paramount state interest). To obtain an injunction, a plain-
tiff must meet the requirements otherwise necessary for an injunction
and also show that the state court prosecution is motivated by bad
faith harassment.
11. Claim and Issue Preclusion. Preclusion, whether claim or is-
sue, eliminates the opportunity for parties to relitigate in a second
lawsuit matters that were central to a prior lawsuit. Where the sub-
ject matter is the same in the two lawsuits, claim preclusion (res judi-
cata) gives preclusive effect in the second lawsuit to everything that
was or could and should have been raised in the first lawsuit. Where
the subject matter is different, issue preclusion (collateral estoppel)
precludes relitigation of an issue both actually and necessarily de-
cided. Questions as to what is precluded are resolved by reference to
the preclusion law of the jurisdiction whose court rendered the origi-
nal judgment.
12. Administrative Procedures Act. All states and the federal gov-
ernment have statutes governing appeals from agency decisions that
provide only limited court review of an agency hearing decision.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION HYPOTHETICAL
The hypothetical provided here illustrates the importance for con-
stitutional litigation of the various concepts set forth in Part II. In one
sense, the hypothetical is entirely unrealistic because it creates what
will not be found in life-a state agency to handle building permits
and a jail sentence for violation of a statute governing building per-
mits. But in another sense, that which is critical for this Article, the
hypothetical IS realistic because it permits a full discussion of the de-
cision tree that must be employed when deciding what claims to raise
and in which court system to bring suit.
4. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 452 (1974).
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WHAT LIKELIHOOD CANDLES IN THE CATHEDRAL?
You represent the Roman Catholic diocese of Nebraska. The dioce-
san cathedral is seventy-five years old. It is built of concrete, marble,
and plaster. The only wood in the church is that used in the pews and
kneelers. The only fabric is the altar skirt.
The cathedral is scheduled for major renovation, including an addi-
tion to its front half. In the front alcoves on either side of the altar,
there are racks of votary candles that have been in place since the
cathedral was built. Not all the candles are lit at any one time. A
candle is lit when a supplicant chooses to make a special prayer.
Bishop Raymond, pastor of the cathedral, applied to the State
Commissioner of the Interior for a building permit for church renova-
tion. A recently enacted state statute provides: "No public building
hereinafter constructed may contain open flame devices. A building in
violation will be shut down until brought into compliance. The person
responsible for the violation is subject to six months imprisonment
and a fine of up to $1000 per day for each day of violation." Citing the
statute, the commissioner refused to issue the building permit so long
as the plan of the cathedral included the votive candles.
Bishop Raymond comes to you for advice. You read the statute and
note that the statute does not directly mention churches and that
nothing in it explicitly refers to renovation as compared to new con-
struction. You learn that, under state law, an interpretation of a stat-
ute provided by the State Commissioner of the Interior must be
appealed to a hearing officer in the State Agency of the Interior and
then may be appealed to a state trial court under the State Adminis-
trative Procedures Act.
Bishop Raymond is emphatic that he wants to challenge the candle
prohibition in the renovated cathedral and equally emphatic that he
wants to assure that the statute is not applied to churches, whether
for renovations or new buildings.
What to do and where to do it?
A. Potential Claims
Bishop Raymond has available a federal constitutional and state
statutory claim. The federal constitutional claim is the abridgement
of the First Amendment free exercise of religion. The state claim is
based on the commissioner's interpretation of the statute to include
churches as public buildings and renovation as well as new
construction.
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B. Whether to Settle
The question whether to attempt to settle is easily resolved on
these facts by Bishop Raymond's clear interest in establishing prece-
dent that exempts churches from the reach of the statute.
C. Administrative Remedies and Estoppel
State law specifies that decisions by the State Commissioner of the
Interior may be challenged in court only after exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies. This means that you may not litigate your claim in
state court (at least, not without first challenging the constitutionality
of this restriction on your right to sue), and this also means that no
state court review is possible until after you submit for agency hearing
your challenge to the commissioner's interpretation of the statute.
You will need to examine agency jurisdiction and state joinder and
estoppel law to decide whether you also must submit the free exercise
claim.
Assume you bring your claims to the state agency. The state per-
mits appeal of an adverse agency decision to a state trial court. Your
decision whether to appeal depends on whether you seek to sue in fed-
eral court. Federal preclusion law does not foreclose a lawsuit based
on a prior administrative decision, but it generally prohibits a later
lawsuit if an administrative decision is appealed to a state court and
under that state's estoppel law, the state court appeal bars a subse-
quent lawsuit in state court.
D. Erie Type Complications
The building permit is new. Because there are no reported Ne-
braska decisions, you need neither select nor avoid state court to
achieve a change in, or assure a continuation of, existing Nebraska
caselaw.
E. Considerations Particular to Suit in Federal Court
1. Justiciability Issues. The justiciability issues most likely to
have an impact on litigation are mootness, ripeness, and standing.
Neither ripeness nor mootness problems arise on these facts.
The case is ripe-Bishop Raymond is ready to renovate. He has
clear and concrete plans. He is stopped from proceeding by the denial
of the permit. The only possible ripeness issue relates to Bishop Ray-
mond's challenge to the statute's applicability to new construction.
The case is not moot, nor likely to be so while litigation proceeds.
Even if Bishop Raymond elects to renovate without waiting for a per-
mit, the case will not be moot because this choice subjects him to jail
and fine.
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Standing, too, is unlikely to be an impediment to a federal court
suit. The only potential standing issue also relates to Bishop Ray-
mond's challenge to the statute's applicability to new construction
since he is not harmed by that aspect of the statute. His challenge to
its applicability to churches clearly applies to the cathedral. His chal-
lenge to its applicability to renovation clearly applies to the cathedral.
Assuming that the statutory construction claim may be heard in fed-
eral court,5 Bishop Raymond may be able to claim injury even as to
new construction based on his position as representative of the entire
diocese.
2. The Eleventh Amendment Means a Federal Lawsuit May Be
Maintained Only on the Free Exercise Claim.
a. The first claim-free exercise-is based on federal law. You
likely will frame the claim as a federal civil rights violation under sec-
tion 1983.6 Since Congress has not abrogated a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity for section 1983 lawsuits, the first thing you
must check is whether the state has waived sovereign immunity for
this type of lawsuit. You investigate and learn that the state has not.
Therefore, if you sue in federal court you may name neither the state
nor a state agency as a party to the lawsuit. The Ex parte Young fic-
tion will permit you to avoid the bar of the Eleventh Amendment by
suing the commissioner in his official capacity, but only for an injunc-
tion. Thus, a claim under section 1983 will be a claim against the
commissioner for injunctive relief for violation of Bishop Raymond's
First Amendment free exercise rights.
b. The second claim-the commissioner's interpretation of the
statute-is based on state law. Section 1983 is unavailable for asser-
tion of state-based claims. That means you cannot transpose the state
claim into a federal claim. As a consequence, the only potential in-
dependent basis of jurisdiction for this claim is diversity. But there is
no diversity because Bishop Raymond and the commissioner are both
Nebraska residents.
c. Another option permitting litigation of the state claim in federal
court is supplemental (pendent) jurisdiction. Bishop Raymond's state
claim clearly arises out of the same nucleus of operative fact as his
federal claim. At first glance, then, it would appear that you may in-
clude the state claim as a second count and pend it to the federal
claim. Unfortunately, however, Bishop Raymond's state claim may
not be pended because the Eleventh Amendment stands in the way.
The suit against the commissioner effectively is a suit against the
state. While the Ex parte Young fiction is a way around the Eleventh
Amendment that permits a federal court to hear a suit that effectively
5. As I describe later, this claim cannot be heard in federal court, not because it is
not justiciable but because of the Eleventh Amendment. See infra Part 1mI.E.2.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. I 1997).
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is against the state, the fiction applies to state officer violation of fed-
eral law only. The commissioner's interpretation of a state statute
presents a state-based claim that is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.
A lawsuit in federal court, then, may be maintained only on the
free exercise claim. If you seek to bring the state claim too, then you
must sue in state court.
3. Pullman Abstention. The commissioner's interpretation of the
state statute presents a classic opportunity for the employment of
Pullman abstention. The question whether the statute, as interpreted
by the commissioner, violates Bishop Raymond's free exercise rights
depends on whether the commissioner has correctly interpreted the
statute. The statute is newly enacted. There are no existing court
opinions interpreting it or describing its scope. Should the commis-
sioner move for federal court abstention on the basis of Pullman, he
stands a fair chance of succeeding. Similarly, if there is a certification
procedure available to test the commissioner's construction of the stat-
ute, the federal judge may elect to certify the question to the state
supreme court.
Pullman abstention is not an unfavorable outcome to a plaintiff
who wants a state court decision on a state claim and a federal court
decision on a federal claim. For various reasons, a defendant's em-
ployment of Pullman abstention is one way, and perhaps the only ef-
fective way, for a plaintiff to achieve that result. A plaintiff may not
bring suit in federal court and, at the same time, petition a federal
judge to abstain. However, a plaintiff interested in bifurcating claims
should consider ways to optimize the chance that a defendant will
move for Pullman abstention.
The likelihood is that you will oppose a federal court decision to
abstain because this will run up costs and produce delay. Bishop Ray-
mond may well want to begin cathedral renovation as soon as possible.
If it is important to contain costs and obtain a decision as quickly as
possible, then the risk of Pullman abstention may mean you should
sue in state court. Your other option is to wait and see whether ab-
stention is requested and granted. If you are remitted to state court,
at that point you can submit the entire case for state court decision
and move to dismiss the federal court litigation.
4. Maintaining Two Lawsuits: The Effect of Estoppel Law. As I
just demonstrated, it is not possible to join Bishop Raymond's state
and federal claims in a lawsuit in federal court. Bifurcation of claims
might be achieved by Pullman abstention. Could it also be achieved in
the first instance by suing in a state court on the state claim and in
federal court on the federal claim? It would have to be quite an unu-
sual situation before such an option even would be considered, as rea-
sons of efficiency and economy argue against such a choice. But
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assume that yours is the unusual case. Consider what may happen if
you bifurcate.
a. First, consider the effect of claim preclusion (res judicata) when
the federal court action comes to final judgment first. There are two
potential outcomes. The first is much more likely, but not guaranteed.
Claim preclusion applies only to those matters that were raised and
litigated or could and should have been raised and litigated. By defi-
nition, the state claim is not one that could have been litigated in fed-
eral court. On this analysis, then, there will be no claim preclusion if
the federal court comes to final decision first. Alternatively, the case
could be analyzed as follows: Although the federal court was unavaila-
ble to hear the state claim, there was a general jurisdiction court
(state court) that could have heard both claims. The failure to sue
where both claims could be heard will work an estoppel.
b. Next, consider the effect of claim preclusion when the state
court action comes to final judgment first. Here, there generally is no
question that the state court answer will effect a claim preclusion on
the federal court action because the state court was open to hear both
state and federal claims. The only exception will be a situation in
which the state court lawsuit was simply an appeal of an agency deci-
sion and the agency had no jurisdiction to entertain the federal consti-
tutional claim.
c. Even if the federal court decision does not preclude bringing a
state court action, there still is the possibility of issue preclusion, as
issue preclusion is not dependent on whether the claim in the subse-
quent litigation could have been raised in the earlier litigation but in-
stead runs to any issue between the parties that necessarily was
decided. Issue preclusion also, obviously, would run from state to fed-
eral court.
d. In the absence of Pullman abstention, your best shot at ob-
taining two separate decisions, neither obviated by claim preclusion,
would be to file the federal court action first and wait to file the state
court action until after the federal action is far enough along to assure
that it will proceed to final judgment before the state court judgment.
5. Bishop Raymond Risks Jail. Bishop Raymond may choose to
renovate without permit if he is sufficiently persuaded of the rightness
of his cause and the likelihood that he will prevail on the merits. If he
is wrong, however, then he is in jeopardy of a jail sentence and fine.
He could seek a federal court injunction against institution of a prose-
cution against him. However, his chances of success are zero as a fed-
eral judge will employ Younger v. Harris abstention.
6. Switching Gears: Assume a City Ordinance Rather Than a
State Statute Prohibits Candles in the Cathedral. In this situation,
the Eleventh Amendment impediment disappears as a city may be
sued in federal court under section 1983 without offending the Elev-
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enth Amendment. You can name the city. You can sue the city for
damages as well as injunctive relief. Damages against the city will
require that Bishop Raymond prove that the city in its own right vio-
lated his free exercise rights and those of his church. Cities are not
vicariously liable under section 1983 for the actions of their employ-
ees. Respondeat superior does not apply.
IV. AMPLIFIED DISCUSSION WITH CITATIONS
A. The Lawyer's Think List
While there are differences between litigating a constitutional case
and litigation generally, by and large the same techniques of litigation
apply to both. What I highlight here are some issues of particular im-
portance in constitutional litigation.
1. What's the Main Goal? Client Interest or Making Law? Are you
primarily a constitutional litigator or are you primarily representing
the interest of your client? A variation of this question arises when
the client is an institutional client with long-range interests that go
beyond the particular case.
If the main goal is making law, then:
a. First and foremost, you must have the consent and participation
of your client. Her interest may be best served by a quick and satisfac-
tory settlement, and she must understand the consequences of choos-
ing litigation.
b. If your client is willing to make her case a test case, then you
still need to consider whether the facts warrant proceeding that way.
You need to evaluate the type case you are litigating as well as the
energy level of your adversary. If you have particularly good facts-
and your client's consent-you may want to arrange things so that
settlement is not a realistic possibility. Conversely, if your client pre-
fers settlement to potentially protracted and fractious litigation or if
there is a very good chance of very bad precedent being set, then not
litigating may be the best solution.
Consider the actions of the Black Leadership Forum, a combina-
tion of Civil Rights groups, that shared in paying a settlement to
Sharon Taxman, a white school teacher who claimed an equal protec-
tion violation when she was laid off solely on the basis of race while an
African-American teacher was retained.7 The Forum was fearful of a
decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that would elimi-
nate affirmative action as a remedy for equal protection violations un-
less the particular employer engaged in purposeful discrimination. To
avoid that result, the civil rights groups were willing both to pay a
7. See Taxman v. Board of Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547, 1549-50 (3d Cir.
1996).
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large part of the settlement and to endure public discussion of their
negative assessment of obtaining a favorable decision on affirmative
action.8
2. Look to Others Litigating Related Cases with Whom You Should
Consult. There may be special interest civil liberties litigation groups
that have ideas and particular strategies that would be helpful. They
may be able to point you to effective trial strategy. You need to con-
sider whether there is a long-range game plan that you should hook
into. Consider Justice Marshall and the desegregation cases. It was
not serendipity that the separate but equal cases were litigated in a
particular order and that the miscegenation statutes were not the first
to be attacked.
If the main goal is representing a client, then the impact on other
litigation is not a concern. Your calculus here is simply the calculus in
which you would engage in any litigation. The general rule is to avoid
litigation if you can. That keeps costs down and solves problems most
expeditiously.
3. Follow the Procedural Steps. Keep a Good Paper Trail.
a. Make sure your client has done the appropriate things in the
appropriate way. If not, go back and take corrective actions if you can.
There is no sense litigating only to find an earlier default is an impedi-
ment to success. Advise your client to get or put things in writing.
That means not assuming what an administrator's reaction will be,
but (i) having your client engage in the challenged behavior and get-
ting the administrative reaction or (ii) writing a letter describing what
she wants to do and waiting for a response or (iii) better yet, writing a
letter describing the anticipated response and asking the administra-
tor to respond in writing if you are wrong.
b. If your main litigation goal is obtaining the best result for your
client in the most expeditious fashion then, before going to court, you
may want to give your adversary a chance to back down, settle, or
compromise. You need to write and say, "You are doing A. If you do
not stop doing A, then I will advise my client to sue, get an injunction,
etc."
4. Keep Your Eye on the Record. Talk to an appellate lawyer before
litigating. Think about the record on appeal while litigating. The only
facts you can point to on appeal are those which were in evidence at
trial. No matter how persuasive, helpful, and even dispositive certain
facts might be, if they are not in the record, then they cannot help you
with the factfinder and, for purposes of appeal, they do not exist.
8. See Nat Hentoff, A Victim of Affirmative Action, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 6, 1998, at
20, 20.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
B. Administrative Remedy or Lawsuit
1. Exhaustion. Often you will be required to exhaust state admin-
istrative remedies before suing. Certain federal claims require ex-
haustion of state administrative procedures while others, in particular
section 1983 claims, do not. When, as with section 1983 claims, the
particular violation alleged provides a choice whether to submit a
claim to an agency or to proceed directly to court, you should consider
whether you have a better likelihood of prevailing before an agency.
Under most statutory schemes, after final agency determination, you
will be able to appeal to a court. Such an appeal typically will be on an
administrative standard of review where reversal occurs only if the
decision is found to be:
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accord-
ance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations of statutory
rights;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence... ; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de
novo by a reviewing court.9
2. Potential Claim Preclusion on Later Federal Court Action. For
certain federal claims, appeal of a state administrative decision to
state court may foreclose a later full trial on the merits in federal
court. The federal courts are required to give the same preclusive ef-
fect to a judgment as would be given in the jurisdiction whose court
rendered the judgment. Although section 173810 applies to judicial
and not administrative proceedings, the Supreme Court has applied
the statute to a Title VII claim in which a litigant followed the Title
VII statutory mandate by first submitting her claim to a state
agency."1 Section 1738 was triggered when the litigant appealed the
state agency decision to a state court for review on an APA standard of
review.-12 You may avoid such preclusive effect by not appealing an
adverse agency decision.J3
C. Independent and Adequate State Grounds
1. A state supreme court is the last word on the meaning and scope
of that state's law. If a state-based claim is the only claim litigated in
state court, then that claim typically is not reviewable by the Supreme
Court of the United States. Suppose, however, that you are in state
9. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1994).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
11. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 484 (1982) (finding that
Title VII contains no legislative intent to deny res judicata).
12. See id. at 464.
13. See University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 798-99 (1986).
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court and raise both state and federal claims (or your adversary raises
a federal claim in response to your state-based claim). The doctrine of
independent and adequate state grounds may still preclude Supreme
Court review. If a state ground is independent (in other words, it is
sufficient in itself to sustain the judgment) and adequate (in other
words, the decision does not violate federal law), then the Supreme
Court has no power to review the decision. A state court may decide a
federal claim as an alternative ground for its decision. A state court
may decide a state claim yet cite to federal precedent in so doing. So
long as the state court makes clear that it is deciding and relying
solely on the state ground for its decision, then the Supreme Court
may not review.14
You cannot make a ground adequate merely by claiming violation
only of state law. A ground is adequate only if its resolution cannot be
said to violate federal law. For example, assume you represent the
state and claim that a warrantless search of a dwelling place was con-
stitutional under the state constitution. Assume also that the state
supreme court agrees. If the defendant claims that such a warrant-
less search violates the federal Fourth Amendment, then the Supreme
Court still has power to review. This is true even if the state supreme
court includes a clear statement that any discussion of federal consti-
tutional law was unnecessary for its decision and that it relies exclu-
sively on the state ground. A state ground must be independent and
adequate both in form and substance.
2. The independent and adequate state ground may be substantive
(the example provided above) or procedural. A procedural ground will
be adequate so long as state procedure meets minimal due process
standards,15 applies evenhandedly to both state and federal claims, is
supported by prior state practice, 16 and does not pose too great a bur-
den on the opportunity to have a federal claim heard.17
3. Consider what may happen if you raise two grounds for relief,
one state and one federal.l8 The trial judge decides the state ground in
a way favorable to you but does not decide the federal ground. You
14. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983).
15. See, e.g., Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Say. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 681 (1930).
16. See, e.g., James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 350 (1984).
17. See, e.g., Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418-19 (1965).
18. The discussion in text is framed as one in which there is a federal and a state
ground. Ifinstead both claims derived from state law, then the issue of Supreme
Court review of a substantive claim would no longer be present as there would no
longer be a federal question triggering the power to review. The problem that
arises when a trial judge decides only one of two claims and stops is still present,
however. You still should try to persuade the trial judge to decide the second
ground. Moreover, any refusal to consider the second ground when properly
raised and preserved will trigger potential review by the Supreme Court of the
United States as to whether state procedure as implemented violates procedural
due process.
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should move for a decision on the federal ground. One problem if you
don't do this-and it can be costly-is that, in some states, neither
side can raise the federal ground on appeal because neither side lost
on it. If the state appellate court reverses on the state ground, then
you have a right to a decision on the remaining federal ground, but
you will likely be remanded for decision and may have to have a sec-
ond trial. Another problem-and this is fatal to you-is that your
state procedure may require, in order to preserve the federal ground
for subsequent resolution, that you move before the trial judge for de-
cision on that ground. Your failure to so move will be a procedural
default that will prevent you from getting the federal claim heard.
You very well may be unsuccessful in getting a trial judge to decide
both claims, particularly if the federal claim is a constitutional one. In
the first place, you are asking a judge to do work she thinks is unnec-
essary. Moreover, a constitutional claim triggers a canon of construc-
tion which dictates that a judge decide non-constitutional claims first
and, if possible, decide them to the exclusion of constitutional ones.1 9
To avoid a procedural default, it is unnecessary that the judge does
as you request. That, after all, is ultimately out of your control. What
is critical is that you do everything in state procedure to preserve your
right for decision on the claim. At a minimum, you should move on
the record for a decision on the federal ground.
D. Article M and Prudential Justiciability Issues (Standing,
Mootness, Ripeness, etc.)
Justiciability constraints dictate when and by whom a lawsuit may
be brought. They more likely will affect your opportunity to sue in
federal rather than state court because federal court justiciability re-
quirements, except in isolated cases,20 are stricter that those of state
courts. Federal court justiciability constraints are ticking time bombs
that may be raised by a litigant, even the plaintiff, at any point in the
litigation or by a federal judge on her own motion.21
1. Standing. Standing has both constitutional (Article 111)22 and
prudential aspects to it. Article III requires that a plaintiff have "a
personal stake" in the litigation. 23 That means that the plaintiff must
have injury in fact running to her that is "fairly traceable" to the de-
19. See, e.g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
20. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 262 n.8 (1977).
21. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 825-26 (1997); DeFunis
v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 315-16 (1974).
22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
23. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
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fendant's conduct and that is redressable by the remedy sought.24 Ar-
ticle III justiciability constraints limit all federal courts, including the
Supreme Court of the United States on a case originating in a state
court.
Be careful about the remedy that you seek. Particularly in equal
protection cases, an injunction may result in a dismissal because an
injunction does not guarantee that a plaintiff can get the remedy he
seeks even with a winning case on the merits. This is so because
equality may be achieved by bringing the plaintiff up to the standard
of others, in which case the plaintiff would get the substantive result
she seeks, or by bringing the others down to the standard of the plain-
tiff, in which case the plaintiff would get equal protection but not the
substantive result sought.25
In addition to the constitutional limits prescribed by Article III, the
Supreme Court has enunciated prudential standing concerns that,
when applicable, ordinarily result in federal court refusal to entertain
a lawsuit. A "generalized grievance" shared by large numbers of citi-
zens is not one that a federal court typically will hear.26 Further, a
plaintiff suffering actual injury typically also must show that his claim
is based on a legal right that belongs to him and not to another.27
This latter consideration minimizes the opportunity for a third party
standing case to be heard in federal court. Prudential standing may
be overridden by countervailing interests in a particular case or by
express congressional authorization in a class of cases.28
2. Ripeness. Ripeness means a controversy is not yet ready to be
heard.29 It is closely related to standing. Standing focuses on the liti-
gants before the court while ripeness focuses on the status of the
claim.
3. Mootness. Mootness means that a controversy has become stale
because by the time it was ready for court resolution the plaintiffs
injury no longer was redressable by the remedy sought. For example,
a litigant seeking to divorce who challenges a one-year residency re-
quirement may have resided in a state longer than one year (and may
have obtained a divorce) by the time her case is heard.30 There are
four strategies that can save a case from dismissal on mootuess
grounds. First, if possible you can substitute plaintiffs with live
24. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 44-46 (1976).
25. See Simon, 426 U.S. at 44-46. Notwithstanding potential problems with injunc-
tive relief, at times that may be your only alternative. See infra text accompany-
ing note 30.
26. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 499.
27. See id.
28. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162-63 (1997).
29. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983).
30. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1975).
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claims for plaintiffs whose claims are about to become moot. Second,
you can join several individuals as plaintiffs, individuals who are dif-
ferently related in time to the claim. This strategy may be prevented
or limited by standing requirements, however. Third, if possible and
otherwise advisable, a plaintiff can request damages and not simply
an injunction. Damages redress past injury suffered while an injunc-
tion, by contrast, is forward-seeking and cannot remedy a violation for
a plaintiff who no longer is in a situation to suffer injury. Recognize,
however, that a request for damages means a jury trial and you may
prefer to try the matter to a judge. In addition, sovereign immunity
issues may mean that damages cannot be requested. Fourth, a law-
suit may be saved from dismissal on mootness grounds if it proceeds
as a class action.3 1 With a revolving class, at any given time there is a
person to keep the controversy live. At given points, you may have to
substitute for the class representative another member of the class.
E. Pullman Abstention
Pullman abstention most often comes into play when a plaintiff
brings a federal question action in federal court and there is imbedded
in that action an unsettled question of state law that necessarily must
be resolved. 32 A federal judge may exercise discretion to abstain from
deciding a federal question until after a state court resolves a state
law issue. Factors relevant to a decision to abstain are the newness of
state law, the importance of the law to a state, the absence of state
cases construing the law, and the fact that a particular state construc-
tion would obviate the need to decide a federal constitutional claim.
Pullman abstention is available in section 1983 actions brought in
federal court.3 3 Pullman abstention also is available when a federal
lawsuit challenges the constitutionality of a state statute under the
federal constitution and a lawsuit pending in state court challenges
the constitutionality of the statute under the state constitution. 34
Pullman abstention occasionally even has been employed in diversity
cases.
35
Pullman abstention typically means that a federal judge stays,
rather than dismisses, the federal court proceeding. Retaining juris-
diction permits a federal judge to provide interim relief or to reacti-
vate the federal case in the event of undue delay or other difficulty in
state court.
31. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23; Sosna, 419 U.S. at 399; United States Parole Comm'n v.
Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 398 (1980); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 40
(1974) (holding that state class actions are justiciable in federal court).
32. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941).
33. See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 169, 176 (1959).
34. Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476, 477-78 (1971).
35. See, e.g., Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41, 44 (1970).
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A plaintiff remitted to state court may elect to submit both state
and federal claims to the state court,3 6 or he may preserve his right to
return to federal court on the federal claim by not seeking "a complete
and final adjudication of his rights in a state court."3 7 On occasion, a
state court will be unable adequately to resolve the state question-
particularly, in an applied context-unless the federal question is
presented to it. So long as the plaintiff is clear that he reserves his
right to return to federal court on the federal claim, the state court
judgment will have no res judicata effect even if the state court de-
cides the federal question.
Many states38 today have a statutory procedure by which a federal
court may certify a state question to a state supreme court.39 Such a
procedure effectively substitutes for Pullman abstention. It permits a
federal court to retain a case and yet have the state supreme court, the
final authority on state law, resolve the state question.
F. Supplemental (Pendent) Jurisdiction
Supplemental (pendent) jurisdiction40 is the means by which a
claim based on state law may be heard in federal court even though
there is no diversity between plaintiffs and defendants. Simply put,
when non-diverse parties raise a state claim that arises out of the
same nucleus of operative fact as a federal question claim also being
brought in federal court, then the state claim may be pended to the
federal claim.41 Pendent jurisdiction permits a federal judge in her
discretion to consider this pended state claim even if the federal claim
ultimately drops out and requires that a federal judge consider this
pended state claim before considering a federal constitutional claim. 42
36. When a plaintiff submits both state and federal claims to the state court, the
loser in state court may petition the Supreme Court of the United States to grant
a writ of certiorari. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 427-28 (1963).
37. Cf England v. Louisiana State Bd., 375 U.S. 411, 419 (1964) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
38. Not all states provide for supreme court resolution of certified questions. See,
e.g., Michaels v. New Jersey, 150 F.3d 257, 259 (3d Cir. 1998). In a state with
justiciability requirements equivalent to those operative in the federal courts, a
certification process likely would be unconstitutional under the state
constitution.
39. For an example of a court certifying a question to a state supreme court, see
Ageloff v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 860 F.2d 379, 388 (11th Cir. 1988).
40. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994). Section 1367 also covers what formerly was known
as ancillary jurisdiction.
41. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
42. See Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 192 (1909).
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G. Interplay of Supplemental Jurisdiction and Ex Parte
Young
On occasion a plaintiff may allege that a state officer acted in viola-
tion of both federal and state law. Absent the wrinkle caused by the
Eleventh Amendment, the general rule of supplemental jurisdiction
would permit both claims to be heard in federal court if they both
arose out of a common nucleus of operative fact. Here's the wrinkle:
the Ex parte Young fiction waives the Eleventh Amendment bar for
suits alleging state officer violation of federal, but not state, law. That
means that the Eleventh Amendment stands as a bar to a federal
court hearing a claim against a state officer that is based on state law
even when that claim otherwise may properly be pended to a federal
claim.4 3
H. State Sovereign Immunity: Actions Brought in State
Court
State sovereign immunity involves actions brought against a state
in either state or federal court. In both courts, the general rule is that
a state may be sued only with its consent or pursuant to congressional
abrogation of its sovereign immunity where Congress has the consti-
tutional authority to abrogate. The Eleventh Amendment governs ac-
tions in federal court but does not, by its terms, speak to actions
brought in state court. At best, congressional power to abrogate is no
broader in state than federal court. In state court, Congress may use
its Article I legislative power to abrogate state sovereign immunity
only if there is "compelling evidence" that states were required to do
this at the inception of constitutional democracy in the United States
and that so doing is consistent with the history and structure of the
Constitution. 44 What appears true, but is by no means guaranteed, is
that Congress may use section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to ab-
rogate state sovereign immunity in state court actions in any circum-
stance in which it may do so in federal court actions.4 5 The scope of
that power is discussed later.46
A state may choose whether and what actions may be brought
against it in its own courts by its own citizens or citizens of other
states or nations.47 The most common, and most important, vehicle
43. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984).
44. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2255 (1999).
45. See id. at 2267. The Ex parte Young fiction, see supra Part II.E.2 (discussing Ex
parte Young with regard to the Eleventh Amendment and federal court actions),
also applies in state court and permits a state-court suit for injunctive relief
against a state officer. See General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 226-27 (1908).
46. See infra text accompanying notes 53-68.
47. It even appears possible that a state may waive its sovereign immunity for a
state-based claim and refuse to do so for a federal claim. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at
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by which a state waives its sovereign immunity is a state tort claims
act.
1. Persons Covered by State Tort Claims Act. State tort claims acts
typically cover employees of a state, state agencies, and members of
boards or commissions when acting in their official capacities. The op-
erative phrase, "employee of the state," is analogous to the phrase,
"employee of the government," in the Federal Tort Claims Act.48 An
"employee of the government" is anyone who is in a master-servant
relationship with an agency. To resolve questions under the federal
act, courts have tended to apply the common law principle that looks
to the degree of control exercised by the agency over the details of the
employment. The greater the control the more likely that the individ-
ual is treated as an employee and not as an independent contractor.
2. Scope of Liability. State tort claims acts typically are the exclu-
sive vehicle for recovery against a state for anyone who claims to be
injured by a state employee. These acts typically exempt a state from
any liability for intentional torts. They also typically exempt from lia-
bility discretionary functions or duties even if the discretion is abused.
A state employee may be sued outside the contours of the state tort
claims act but only in her personal capacity.49
Assuming that (a) a plaintiffs claim is grounded in a tort cogniza-
ble under a state tort claims act, (b) the state employee's activity does
not involve a discretionary act, and (c) the plaintiff is successful in
proving commission of the tort, there nonetheless is typically no liabil-
ity if the state employee exercised due care in enforcing a statute,
rule, or regulation. A plaintiff may recover against a state, therefore,
only if a state employee failed to exercise due care.
3. Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act. Many states have polit-
ical subdivisions tort claims acts that cover employees of political sub-
divisions in the same manner and to the same extent that a state tort
claims act covers state employees.
L Actions Brought in Federal Court: The Eleventh
Amendment
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
2268. If true, sovereign immunity would trump federal law prohibiting discrimi-
nation against federal rights. But see Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392-93 (1947);
Mondou v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 56 (1912).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).
49. While a state employee remains liable in her personal capacity for any legally
cognizable injury, she either will be judgment proof or at least not have pockets
as deep as her state employer. This, however, may not be quite the obstacle it
seems. You should investigate whether the state for which the employee works
provides subrogation to employees for personal liability when the claim arose out
of their official duties.
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States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign
state.50
1. General Principles
a. The United States may sue a state in state or federal district
court. The theory is that a state's joining the union is a waiver of sov-
ereign immunity as against the greater sovereign. Whether and when
a suit nominally brought by the United States may be treated for pur-
poses of sovereign immunity as one in fact brought by the United
States is not entirely clear. The question may well be the subject of
increasing litigation. 5 1
b. A state may sue a state in the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court of the United States.
c. The Eleventh Amendment by its terms precludes a federal court
from hearing suits against a state brought either by citizens of an-
other state or by foreign citizens. Although it does not by its terms
cover federal court suits brought against a state by citizens from that
state, a majority of the Court has long held that principles of sovereign
immunity in the Eleventh Amendment preclude a federal court from
hearing the suit.52
2. Exceptions to General Operation of Eleventh Amendment
a. Congressional Abrogation
(i) In Seminole Tribe v. Florida,53 the Court held that congres-
sional power to avoid the Eleventh Amendment resides only in section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congressional power under section 5
is limited to the enforcement, not the creation, of rights.54
(ii) Moreover, there must be "congruence and proportionality" be-
tween the targeted injury and the statutory plan for remedying it.55
(iii) While Congress may waive state sovereign immunity pursuant
to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no
section 5 power to define a property right.56 Even when there is a
property right, moreover, congressional enforcement power does not
permit remedies for negligent state actions;5 7 is triggered only where
50. U.S. CONsT. amend. XI.
51. See, e.g., United States ex. rel. Stevens v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources,
162 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 2391 (1999).
52. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).
53. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
54. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
55. Id. For age discrimination a state need show only a rational relationship be-
tween its employment decisions and their impact on older employees. See Kimel
v. Florida Bd. of Regents, Nos. 98-791, 98-796, 2000 WL 14165 (U.S. Jan. 11,
2000).
56. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., v. College Sav. Bank, 119
S. Ct. 2199, 2208-09 (1999).
57. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-33 (1978).
[Vol. 78:550
1999] FORUM CHOICE IN CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 571
state law remedies are inadequate; 5S is dependent on showing a pat-
tern of constitutional violations by the states; and requires a remedy
tailored to the pattern of violations.59
(iv) Under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may
abrogate a state's sovereign immunity in federal court with regard to
actions brought by a citizen of a state against that state. Congress
may permit both suits for damages and injunctive relief. Because the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted subsequent to the Eleventh
Amendment, it is arguable that under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress may abrogate a state's sovereign immunity
with regard to federal court actions brought against a state by citizens
of other states and foreign citizens (that immunity, in other words,
that was specifically recognized in the Eleventh Amendment).
(v) A precondition to a finding of congressional abrogation is that
Congress must state explicitly an intention to abrogate.60 Among the
statutes in which Congress stated an explicit intention to abrogate
state sovereign immunity are Title VII,61 section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973,62 Title ]X,63 the Age Discrimination Act of 1975,64
and the Americans With Disabilities Act.6 5 In legislation enacted
prior to Seminole Tribe, where Congress abrogated state sovereign im-
munity without specific reference to section 5 of the Fourteenth
58. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 539 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527,
543 (1981).
59. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2209-11. The lower courts are also litigating
other cases concerning the scope of section 5 power with regard to what appear to
be clear property rights. See, e.g., Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 139 F.3d 504,
508-09 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that Congress enacted the copyright statute pur-
suant to section 5 of the 14th Amendment because of state court refusal to recog-
nize copyright claim would deprive person of property without providing due
process protections), vacated, 178 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 1998), and remanded, 180
F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 1999) (for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Florida Prepaid).
60. See the statutory appendix for a more extensive, but still partial, list of statutes
by which Congress stated an explicit intention to waive state sovereign
immunity.
61. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 449 n.2 & 456 (1976).
62. See Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, title X, § 1003,
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a).
63. See id.
64. See id. The Supreme Court recently held that Congress had no power to abrogate
state sovereign immunity with regard to the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act despite an explicit statement of intention to abrogate. See Kimel v. Florida
Bd. of Regents, Nos. 98-791, 98-796, 2000 WL 14165 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2000). The
Kimel decision calls into question the constitutionality of the Age Discrimination
Act of 1975.
65. See Americans with Disability Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (1994).
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Amendment, a current issue is whether any such abrogation is a con-
stitutional exercise of congressional power.66
(vi) It is unclear the extent to which Congress may condition re-
ceipt of federal funds for a federal program on a state's waiver of sov-
ereign immunity.6 7
(vii) Although originally a subject of dispute, it now appears clear
that the Fourteenth Amendment power includes incorporated rights.
(viii) Although not entirely clear, it appears that a state that volun-
tarily litigates in federal court waives its Eleventh Amendment pro-
tection for counterclaims and crossclaims that arise out of the same
fact transaction, at least up to the amount of the state's damages
claim.6 8
(ix) Congress has not abrogated state sovereign immunity for pur-
poses of section 1983 suits against a state. By contrast, there is no
Eleventh Amendment bar for section 1983 suits against a city or
county.
b. State Consent
A state may waive its sovereign immunity with regard to actions
brought against it in federal court. Whether and the extent to which a
state has waived sovereign immunity is a question of state law. More-
over, a state may waive all or part of its sovereign immunity for pur-
poses of actions brought in state court and yet decline to waive
sovereign immunity for federal court actions.6 9
66. See, e.g., Timmer v. Michigan Dep't of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833, 840-41 (6th Cir.
1997) (finding that Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act pursuant to section 5);
Mayer v. University of Minn., 940 F. Supp. 1474, 1477 (D. Minn. 1966) (finding
that Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities
Act pursuant to section 5). See also Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., Nos. 94-
30680, 96-30310, & 97-30719, 2000 WL 19350 (5th Cir. Jan. 27, 2000). The Ped-
erson Court held, properly I think, that once congressional intent to abrogate is
found the question of federal authority to abrogate is found objectively with re-
gard to whether the subject matter falls within the 14th Amendment.
67. At one point, the Supreme Court held state receipt of federal funds would consti-
tute consent to suit even in the absence of explicit statutory language. The the-
ory was constructive waiver. See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 195-96
(1964). Parden now has been overruled. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed.
Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2222 (1999). State consent
will be found, therefore, only when "stated by the most express language or by
such overwhelming implication from the text as will leave no room for any other
reasonable construction." Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-
40 (1985) (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)) (in-
ternal quote marks omitted). To date, however, the Court has not said whether
clear and unequivocal language in connection with receipt of state funds always
will operate as state consent no matter the scope and substance of federal
legislation.
68. See Porto Rico v. Ramos, 232 U.S. 627, 631 (1914); Georgia Dep't of Human Re-
sources v. Bell, 528 F. Supp. 17, 26 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
69. See Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 53-54 (1944).
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A state waives its sovereign immunity by statute.70 It is nonethe-
less possible for a state with no statutory waiver to lose the protection
of sovereign immunity in a particular litigation by failing to claim it.
To the extent a state chooses to interpose a sovereign immunity claim,
it may be possible to do so at any stage in the proceedings. 71
3. Actions Against a State in Federal Court
If there is neither constitutional congressional abrogation nor state
consent, then:
a. You cannot sue a state in federal court for damages.
b. You cannot sue a state in federal court for injunctive relief.
4. The Ex Parte Young Fiction
The Ex parte Young fiction has three components to it:
a. You name the state officer acting officially, and not the state, as
the defendant in the lawsuit.
b. You sue for injunctive relief only. You cannot get damages or
anything that looks like damages even if denominated equitable
relief.7 2
c. You must allege a violation of a federal, not state, right by the
state officer.73
In addition, a detailed statutory scheme for providing relief may
override application of the Exparte Young fiction.74 A remote possible
additional component is that because Ex parte Young is a discretion-
ary doctrine, various factors (availability of state forum; severe ad-
verse effect on federal/state comity) may lead a federal court to decline
to employ the Ex parte Young fiction.75
Although damages are unavailable against a state under section
1983, if you are the prevailing party7 6 you can get attorney fees paid
out of a state treasury as fees are ancillary to the power to issue an
injunction.77 Similarly, you can get expert witness fees.78 Fee agree-
ments pose a difficult ethical problem for a constitutional litigator
when a settlement offer potentially acceptable to a plaintiff exempts
70. See Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Transp., 323 U.S. 459, 468 (1945).
71. See Pemhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121-22 (1984);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 675-77 (1974).
72. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 666-67.
73. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 121.
74. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 75-76 (1996).
75. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 296 (1997) (no majority opinion;
second concurrence limits reach of holding to cases involving the functional
equivalent of a quiet title action).
76. For discussion of the meaning of "prevailing party," see generally Farrar v.
Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992), and Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Ind. Sch.
Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (1989).
77. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678, 692 (1978).
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c) (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
defendants from responsibility for fees and costs (and thereby elimi-
nates what may be the only reasonable possibility of lawyer
payment).79
J. Federal Civil Rights Suit, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
1. State Employees
a. Liability Under Section 1983
Section 1983 reads in pertinent part as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress .... 80
(i) Persons Subject to Suit. Section 1983 creates a federal cause of
action for violation of a federal right by a state officer or employee
acting within the scope of his employment at the time he committed
the alleged violation. Section 1983 also covers private individuals
when "engaged in conduct otherwise chargeable to the State."81
Under section 1983, a person may not sue a state or state agency, but
may employ the Ex parte Young fiction to sue a state officer acting
officially for injunctive relief and also may sue a state employee in her
personal capacity for damages, with the damages paid by her out of
her personal financial resources.8 2
Anyone who is formally a state employee is a state actor under sec-
tion 1983 with regard to all conduct undertaken within the scope of
the state employment relationship. Those not formal employees of a
state are nonetheless state actors for purposes of section 1983 when
they enforce state statutes or rules or otherwise perform governmen-
tal functions authorized by a state. They are subject to section 1983
liability for conduct undertaken pursuant to their employment respon-
sibilities that is considered governmental rather than private.
(ii) Scope of liability. There are two types of immunity available to
state employees sued under section 1983: absolute and qualified. Ab-
solute immunity means that there is no liability for conduct no matter
how willful and no matter how clearly violative of a constitutional
right. Qualified immunity permits a state employee to avoid liability
when she can show that she violated no "clearly established statutory
79. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 757 (1986).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
81. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 162 (1992) (private individuals enforcing rights
under state replevin statute).
82. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991); see also supra note 47 and accompa-
nying text.
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or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known."8 3
The Supreme Court of the United States has indicated that quali-
fied immunity is unavailable to at least some categories of private per-
sons undertaking official functions.8 4 The Court left unanswered
whether a private person in these circumstances would have available
an affirmative defense of good faith or probable cause.8 5 What seems
clear, however, is that if absence of good faith is an element of the
particular tort alleged to have been committed, then a private person
would at least have available the traditional tort defense to that tort.
State judicial officers have absolute immunity for actions under-
taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities. 8 6 Judicial ab-
solute immunity has been extended to certain state administrative
hearing officers,8 7 but not to hearing officers who also serve as en-
forcement officers.88
State legislators have absolute immunity for actions undertaken
within the scope of their legislative responsibilities.8 9 Legislative ab-
solute immunity extends to rulemaking activities of certain state ad-
ministrators.9 0 Similarly, legislative absolute immunity extends to
local government officials acting in a legislative capacity when
promulgating ordinances. 91
Prosecutors have absolute immunity for actions that comprise the
prosecutorial function.9 2
All state actors provided absolute immunity for actions within the
scope of their official responsibilities have qualified immunity for ac-
tions outside that scope.
83. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).
84. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 411-13 (1997); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S.
158, 168-69 (1992).
85. See Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 169.
86. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (judicial function includes issuing or-
der resulting in physically bringing lawyer to court); Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349, 363-64 (1978).
87. See Scott v. Schmidt, 773 F.2d 160, 163-64 (7th Cir. 1985).
88. See Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 205-07 (1985) (prison disciplinary
proceedings).
89. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1951).
90. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391,405
(1979); Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 613-14 (8th Cir. 1980)
(absolute immunity for city zoning board plus private citizen proponents of zon-
ing change).
91. See Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 118 S. Ct. 966, 973 (1998).
92. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-28 (1976).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
There is no vicarious liability under section 1983.93 A supervisor
can be personally liable in damages for injury arising out of employee
conduct that violates section 1983, therefore, only if a) the supervisor
ordered the conduct; or b) he can be treated as though he ordered the
conduct because he did nothing to stop the conduct although there was
a clear and recurring pattern of such conduct.
b. State Obligation to Defend. State tort claims acts typically pro-
vide that the attorney general of a state will defend (and that the state
will pay court costs and fees for) any person sued under section 1983
who would be covered by a state tort claims act if sued in state court
on a state cause of action. If a state employee is found liable in a sec-
tion 1983 action, then the state has an action over against the em-
ployee for fees and costs. Thus, although a state may front fees and
costs, there is potential repayment liability in an action against a
state employee brought by a state for reimbursement of monies paid.
The attorney general typically is the state officer who decides whether
to institute a repayment action against a state employee. Generally,
an attorney general undertakes such an action when the judgment es-
tablishes that the state employee acted outside the course of employ-
ment or that his conduct was a willful and wanton neglect of duty.
c. State Obligation to Pay Award. Under a typical state tort
claims act, a state is obligated to pay any damages award entered in a
section 1983 lawsuit so long as the judgment establishes neither that
the conduct occurred outside the course of employment nor that it was
a willful and wanton neglect of duty. Since a state employee has at
least a qualified immunity under section 1983, any damages award
must embody a decision that the state employee violated "clearly es-
tablished statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable per-
son would have known" (the qualified immunity standard).94
2. Claims That May be Brought
a. All Claims Except Those of Procedural Due Process and Negli-
gence. As noted above, section 1983 creates a federal cause of action
for violation of a federal right by a person who is or is deemed to be a
state officer or employee acting within the scope of his employment.
b. Procedural Due Process Claims. Where a property interest is
involved (a toaster; a house), then a state through its employees may
not take and deliberately withhold or damage that property interest
without providing procedural due process protections that meet fed-
eral constitutional minimum standards.9 5 Assume a supervisor in a
93. Some federal statutes do provide for holding a city vicariously liable. See, e.g.,
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2282-94 (1998) (discussing vica-
rious liability under Title VII).
94. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
95. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 542 (1981); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,
530-31 (1984).
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state agency seizes an employee's toaster because he believes its pres-
ence is a fire hazard. The toaster is property. The owner of the
toaster therefore is entitled to procedural due process with regard to
its seizure. In this context, the process that is due is minimal and
likely constitutes simply (i) advance notice to the toaster owner that
the toaster must be removed from the premises or it will be confis-
cated; (ii) notice to the toaster owner of its taking; and (iii) an opportu-
nity for the toaster owner to be heard regarding whether the item
taken was a toaster and whether it constitutes a fire hazard.
c. Negligence Claims. If the toaster was lost through negligence
by a state employee, there is no due process violation because there is
no due process injury arising out of negligent acts.9 6
3. Political Subdivisions
Unlike a state, a political subdivision is a person for purposes of
section 1983.97 There is no vicarious liability under section 1983 for a
political subdivision, however. A political subdivision can be liable for
employee conduct that violates section 1983, therefore, only if the
political subdivision, through high level employees with policy-making
authority, either a) ordered the conduct; or b) can be treated as order-
ing the conduct because nothing was done to stop the conduct
although there was a clear and recurring pattern of such conduct.98 A
pattern involving failure to train employees where that failure caused
constitutional violations may result in section 1983 liability for the
political subdivision.99 But there is no general purpose in section
1983 to replace or enhance traditional state law tort remedies by con-
verting these claims into allegations of due process deprivations.10 0
Moreover, punitive damages may not be assessed against a city or
county.iOl
4. Conclusion Regarding State Employee Liability
a. Persons Clearly State Employees. State employees acting
within the scope of their state employment responsibilities who avoid
willful and wanton conduct in causing tort injury will not be liable to a
state for any damages paid to a plaintiff in a state tort claims act law-
suit. State employees who violate a federal constitutional protection
may have absolute immunity under section 1983 and will have at
least qualified immunity. In lawsuits under both state tort claims
96. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1978).
97. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
98. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997); McMillian v.
Monroe County, 502 U.S. 781, 784-85 (1997); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485
U.S. 112, 123 (1988); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986);
City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 821 (1985).
99. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 380 (1989).
100. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 119 (1992).
101. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerns, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).
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acts and section 1983, moreover, a state's attorney general will enter
to defend the lawsuit and will cover costs and fees.
b. Persons Not Clearly State Employees. Persons not formally em-
ployees of a state for purposes of a state tort claims act are subject to
normal tort rules and subject to potential liability directly to a plain-
tiff. Under normal tort rules, many of the substantive tort actions po-
tentially applicable have good faith defenses that may be asserted.
Persons not formally employees of a state are subject to section 1983
liability only when their activities implicate governmental action.10 2
K. The Erie Factor
A federal court sitting in diversity follows the procedure of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure but employs the substantive law of the
state whose law governs the outcome of the litigation.' 0 3 When state
law is unsettled a federal judge is obliged to predict state law, not to
create or modify it to satisfy his own predilections.10 4 A prediction of
state law means doing what a state supreme court would do if
presented with the case. In theory, that means ignoring existing, but
stale, state supreme court precedent if analysis of changes in state law
in other areas and in the changes in resolution of the legal issue in
other states lead a federal judge to conclude that the state supreme
court would reject its stale precedent. I say "in theory" because there
are relatively few instances in which a federal judge has ignored state
precedent on point. 0 5
L. Bivens Actions Against Federal Officers
There is no counterpart to section 1983 permitting a suit against a
federal officer for violation of a federal right. It is possible, however, to
state a claim for relief grounded in the Constitution itself. 0 6 These
actions are known as Bivens actions. The extent to which Congress
may supersede a Bivens action by providing a statutory claim for relief
is not entirely clear. The Court initially took the position that it would
provide remedies under Bivens unless (1) Congress "explicitly de-
clared" its remedy to be a substitute for a Bivens remedy and (2) the
102. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 951 (1982).
103. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460, 465 (1965).
104. See Lawrence v. Virginia Ins. Reciprocal, 979 F.2d 1053, 1055 (5th Cir. 1992).
105. In at least one instance in which a federal court ignored stale state precedent, the
state court later followed that precedent, thereby demonstrating that the federal
court predicted erroneously. Compare Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Co., 776
F.2d 1565, 1569 (6th Cir. 1985), and Murphree v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 696
F.2d 459, 463 (6th Cir. 1982), with Wyatt v. A-Best Products Co., 924 S.W.2d 98,
105 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).
106. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 390 (1971).
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congressional remedy was "equally effective" with one the Court other-
wise might provide.' 0 7 Later cases suggest that the congressional
remedy need meet neither requirement. 0 8 For Bivens remedies in-
volving Fifth Amendment due process claims, moreover, there is rea-
son to believe that the Federal Tort Claims Act will state the full scope
of the remedy available.09
M Younger v. Harris Abstention
In the Anti-Injunction Actilo Congress directed federal courts not
to interfere with or enjoin state court proceedings. One exception to
the Act is express congressional authorization for federal courts to is-
sue injunctions running to state court proceedings. Section 1983 ac-
tions have been held to embody such authorization.",1 The
circumstances in which a federal court will enjoin a pending criminal
prosecution, however, are exceedingly narrow. The Supreme Court,
out of respect for "our federalism," has said that an injunction against
a pending state prosecution may issue only when a litigant both meets
the requirements otherwise necessary for an injunction (irreparable
harm; remedy at law inadequate) and can show that the prosecution
reflects bad faith harassment on the part of the state.112
State courts are equally competent with federal courts to hear and
vindicate federal rights. Merely instituting a prosecution that alleg-
edly is unconstitutional is not an example of bad faith harassment be-
cause typically the prosecution will provide a means by which a state
court judge can decide whether the activity is constitutional. An ex-
ample of bad faith harassment might be a prosecutor who repeatedly
arrests a person for particular conduct and then repeatedly declines to
prosecute. Even in this situation, where a federal court injunction
might well issue, a person also has available a state court proceeding
for issuance of an injunction.
1. Deciding whether a state court proceeding is pending does not
mean matching state and federal court filing dates to see which action
first was filed. Instead, it involves a decision whether the federal
court injunctive action has progressed so far that it may be said to
constitute "proceedings of substance on the merits.""13 If this stage
has not been reached before the filing of a state court action, then the
107. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 14-15 (1980) (Federal Tort Claims Act remedy
not intended as substitute).
108. See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412,422 (1988); United States v. Stanley, 483
U.S. 669, 683-84 (1987); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1983); Chappell v.
Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298 (1983).
109. See Weiss v. Lehman, 676 F.2d 1320, 1322 (9th Cir. 1982).
110. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994).
111. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 60 (1971).
112. See id. at 65.
113. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 333 (1975).
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state court action is pending for purposes of Younger v. Harris
analysis.
2. Declaratory Judgments. Seeking a declaratory judgment from a
federal court is not subject to the same requirement as an action to
enjoin. Nonetheless, it is not entirely clear what the proper test is
when a litigant seeks a declaratory judgment regarding the constitu-
tionality of claims raised in a pending state criminal proceeding. The
best guess is that the litigant would still need to show bad faith har-
assment. Where a criminal prosecution is threatened, but not yet
pending, there need be no showing of bad faith harassment for a de-
claratory judgment action to proceed. 1i 4 Nor need a litigant meet the
requirements necessary for an injunction to issue. A litigant, of
course, will have to meet federal court justiciability requirements.
Several interesting issues arise here. As an example, a litigant
may obtain a preliminary injunction to prevent a state from filing a
criminal prosecution once the declaratory injunction action is filed. As
a second example, it is unclear whether a litigant with declaratory
judgment in hand may proceed to obtain an injunction without addi-
tional showing. A series of other issues revolve around the estoppel
effect of a declaratory judgment on a prosecution filed in the same case
and the precedential effect of the declaratory judgment on a prosecu-
tion filed in a different case.1 1 5
3. Younger v. Harris is not the only potential impediment to fed-
eral court declaratory judgment action as notions of comity regarding
the propriety of maintaining a second action when one already is
pending also may dictate dismissal.
N. Claim Preclusion (Res Judicata) and Issue Preclusion
(Collateral Estoppel): A Brief Description
1. Claim Preclusion (Res Judicata)
a. Examples
In successive lawsuits where the parties (read narrowly) and sub-
ject matter are the same, the first judgment has preclusive effect in
the second lawsuit as to everything that was or could/should have
been raised in the first lawsuit.
Example (i). Bruiser chops off two of Peaceful's fingers. Peaceful
sues Bruiser for the loss of one finger. Peaceful wins. Then Peaceful
sues for the loss of the second finger. Bruiser, greatly offended, yells,
"Res Judicata." What result?
Bruiser will win. The court will find that Peaceful's rights-that
which Peaceful asserted in the first lawsuit (the finger) and that which
114. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 484 (1974).
115. See generally id. (discussion by various judges on these issues). It likely matters,
moreover, whether the injunction issued in an applied or an on-its-face challenge.
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Peaceful did not assert (the other fnger)-merged. (Merger is the
technical term to describe res judicata effect when the person who
wins in the first lawsuit is greedy and seeks to get more in a second
lawsuit.)
Example (ii). Same facts as in Example (i), but this time Peaceful
loses in the first lawsuit. In the second lawsuit, Bruiser again yells,
"Res Judicata." What result?
Bruiser will win. The court will find that the first judgment is a
bar to the second try. (Bar is the technical term to describe res judi-
cata effect when the person who loses in the first lawsuit is indefatiga-
ble and decides to try again.)
Example (iii). Same facts as in Example (i), but this time Bruiser
also chops off the right front fender of Peaceful's car, causing $1,000+
worth of damages (Peaceful's fingers were resting on the car at the
time of the chopping). There are courts in the state empowered to
hear personal injury claims and courts empowered to hear property
claims; no court is empowered to hear both.116 Peaceful sues on the
property claim and wins. Now Peaceful sues for the loss of the fin-
gers. Bruiser, growing hoarse, against yells, "Res Judicata." What
result?
Peaceful will win. The personal injury claim was not and could not
have been litigated in the first suit.
Example (iv). Same facts as in Example (iii), but this time a court
of general jurisdiction is available. Peaceful nonetheless sues only on
the property claim in a court whose jurisdiction is limited to property
claims. Peaceful wins. Now Peaceful goes to a court of general juris-
diction to sue for the loss of the fingers. Bruiser, a virtual Johnny
One-Note, yells you know what. What result?
Answer 1. If strict res judicata principles are applied, Peaceful will
win. The reason is the same as that given in (iii) above.
Answer 2. Even though Peaceful could not have raised the per-
sonal injury claim in the first lawsuit, Bruiser will win. The reason is
that Peaceful could have found a court to hear both claims. It is
Peaceful's choice, not peculiarities of state law, that led to the succes-
sive lawsuits.
b. The major caveat to the above examples is that everything said
is based on the assumption (certainly valid here) that the loss of two
fingers (and at least the loss of two fingers and property damage in
Example (iv)) arising out of the same fact transaction will equal one
cause of action. Courts sometimes play fast and loose with the defini-
116. While obviously the example in text-courts having, respectively, only personal
injury or property claims juridiction-occurs nowhere in the real world, the prob-
lem of limited jurisdiction courts and the preclusive effect running to their judg-
ments is a real one. See Meding v. Hurd, 607 F. Supp. 1088, 1097 (D. Del. 1985)
(separate courts for law and equity).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
tion of cause of action; res judicata does not apply where the succes-
sive lawsuits concern different causes of action.
2. Issue Preclusion (Collateral Estoppel). In successive lawsuits
where the parties are the same (read more broadly for collateral estop-
pel than for res judicata purposes) but the subject matter is different,
collateral estoppel will apply to preclude relitigation of an issue both
actually and necessarily decided in the first lawsuit.
a. Examples
Example (i). Same facts as in Example 1.a.(iii). The trial on Peace-
fll's claim for the loss of two fingers is about to begin. Peaceful seeks
to estop Bruiser from relitigating the liability question (in other
words, Peaceful seeks to require the court to follow the first court's
decision finding Bruiser liable and thus remove the liability issue from
the second lawsuit). What result?
Answer 1. Peaceful will win. The liability issue actually and nec-
essarily was decided in the first lawsuit. All that's left to prove now is
that with the same chop that destroyed the fender Bruiser also
chopped off two of Peaceful's fingers. This is the technically correct
and logical answer for collateral estoppel purposes and would be the
only answer but for the fact that the first lawsuit was in a court of
limited jurisdiction.
Answer 2. Bruiser will win. Although the liability issue actually
and necessarily was decided in the first lawsuit, to give it estoppel
effect in the second lawsuit would translate the decision of a court of
limited jurisdiction into a decision of a court of general jurisdiction
(the liability issue regarding the loss of Peaceful's two fingers effec-
tively will have been decided in the first lawsuit even though the loss
of the two fingers could not have been litigated in the first lawsuit).
This is the technically correct and logical answer to assure that a
court of limited jurisdiction remains only a court of limited
jurisdiction.
Example (ii). Peaceful is convicted of bigamy. Her second husband
now sues her for the intentional infliction of emotional harm caused by
learning of Peaceful's bigamy. Peaceful seeks to deny she ever mar-
ried Husband No. 1. What result?
Peaceful will be estopped from denying the fact of the first mar-
riage because that issue actually and necessarily was decided in the
first lawsuit.
b. Mutuality of Estoppel-the doctrine that said you could claim
estoppel only if you would have been bound by the earlier judgment
had it gone against you-is not so hard and fast a rule as once it was.
Example. Mr. and Mrs. Passenger and 98 others are passengers on
Freeflight Airline. The plane crashes; all 100 passengers are badly
injured. Mr. Passenger sues Freeflight (Mr. Passenger v. Freeflight)
and wins. Mrs. Passenger may now be able to sue Freeflight and use
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the decision in Mr. Passenger v. Freeflight (finding Freeflight liable) in
her lawsuit even though she was not a party to the lawsuit. If, how-
ever, Mr. Passenger sued Freeffight and lost, Freeffight could not use
Mr. Passenger v. Freeflight to prevent Mrs. Passenger from relitigat-
ing the issue of Freeflight's liability.
0. 28 U.S.C. Section 1738
Basically, section 1738 is the federal statutory equivalent of the
constitutional full faith and credit requirement that binds state
courts.117 It requires federal courts to give the same preclusive effect
to a judgment (claim preclusion) and to issues necessarily decided (is-
sue preclusion) as that which would be given by the rendering
court."-8 Congress may by particular legislation override section
1738. Where a particular subject matter is exclusive to the federal
courts the Court may (but need not) find that "the concerns underlying
a particular grant of exclusive jurisdiction justify a finding of an im-
plied partial repeal of section 1738" by the Congress.119
V. APPENDIX
SELECTED STATUTES RELEVANT TO
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
28 U.S.C. § 2403 (1994) ("Intervention by the United States or a
State; constitutional question"). When the constitutionality of a
federal statute is raised, section 2403(a) requires certification of the
question to the Attorney General of the United States and entitles her
to intervene in the litigation. When the constitutionality of a state
statute is raised, section 2403(b) requires certification of the constitu-
tional question to the attorney general of that state and entitles her to
intervene in the litigation.
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994) ("State and territorial statutes and judi-
cial proceedings; full faith and credit"). Section 1738 requires
that federal courts give a judgment of a state court the same full faith
and credit (claim and issue preclusion) that would be given by that
state's courts.
28 U.S.C. § 1658 (1994) ("Time limitations on the commence-
ment of civil actions arising under Acts of Congress"). Section
1658 establishes a 4-year statute of limitations for federal statutes en-
acted after Dec. 1, 1990.
117. See U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
118. See Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461,470 (1982); Allen v. McCurry,
449 U.S. 90, 95-96 (1980).
119. Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 386
(1985).
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42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994) ("Equal rights under the law"). Section
1981 guarantees rights "equal to white citizens" to, among other
things, make and enforce contracts, sue, and exercise property rights.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp m1 1997) ("Civil action for depri-
vation of rights"). Section 1983 authorizes suit against an officer of
a state acting in his official capacity for violation of a federal constitu-
tional or statutory right.
42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1994). ("Conspiracy to interfere with civil
rights"). Section 1985 provides a civil action for damages if two or
more persons conspire to prevent a federal officer from performing his
duties, to obstruct justice, or to deprive persons of their right to equal
protection of the laws or to vote.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997) ("Proceedings in vindi-
cation of civil rights"). Section 1988 permits recovery of attorney
fees and expert witness fees as part of litigation costs pursuant to 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986, and 13981; Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688; and Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1994 & Supp. I 1997) ("Suits by prisoners").
Section 1997e requires exhaustion of administrative remedies in sec-
tion 1983 prison conditions litigation.
18 U.S.C. § 3626 (1994 & Supp. M 1997) ("Appropriate remedies
with respect to prison conditions"). Section 3626 limits prospec-
tive relief in prison conditions litigation.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A (1994 & Supp. HI 1997) ("Screening"). Section
1915A requires screening of a prisoner suit against the government to
assure the claim is neither frivolous nor barred by a claim of
immunity.
SELECTED CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES APPLICABLE IN
PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE
CLASSIFICATIONS TO WHICH THEY APPLY
1964 Civil Rights Act
Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a. Public Accommodations.
Race, Color, Religion, National Origin.
Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Federally Assisted Program.
Race, Color, National Origin.
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Employment.
Race, Color, Religion, Sex, National Origin.
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was amended by the 1991
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, to specify the remedies available
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when both proper and improper reasons exist for an employment
decision.
1968 Civil Rights Act and 1988 Amendments
Title VIII, 42 U.S.C. § 3604. Housing.
Race, Color, Religion, Sex, National Origin, Familial Status, Hand-
icap (some only).
1972 Education Amendments
Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 & 1684. Federally Assisted Education.
Sex, Blindness, Visual Impairment.
1973 Rehabilitation Act
Section 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Federal Agency or Federally Assisted
Program.
Disability (formerly handicap).
1975 and 1990 Education Acts
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487. Public Education.
Disability (formerly handicap).
1990 Americans with Disabilities Act




29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994). Employment wages. Gender.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act
29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Employment.
Age (at least 40). (Supreme Court declared congressional abroga-
tion unconstitutional. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, Nos. 98-
791, 98-796, 2000 WL 14165 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2000).
STATUTES IN WHICH CONGRESS STATED AN INTENTION
TO ABROGATE STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The following statutes are among those in which Congress has au-
thorized suits against states. For some of these statutes there may be
a question whether the abrogation survives Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S.
44 (1996).
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Equal Employment, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e.
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12202
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7, Civil rights remedies equalization:
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794.
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Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1681-1688.
Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107.
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
The provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimina-
tion by recipients of Federal financial assistance.
